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Over the previous twenty years, 
ample institutional reforms have been 
implemented in the most member 
countries of OECD, granting their central 
banks more independence from the 
government. Since one of the 
preconditions for monetary integration, 
according to the Maastricht Treaty, is a 
considerable level of independence of 
central bank, the Central and Eastern 
European countries have made serious 
efforts to grand more independence to 
their central banks. Also, many emerging 
market countries implemented 
institutional reform that granted a high 
degree of independence to their central 
banks. 
Central bank independence 
represents the freedom of monetary 
policymakers from direct political or 
governmental influence in the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
Central bank independence hinders the 
influence of political power on the 
authority in charge of the elaboration and 
implementation of monetary policy. 
Practical experience has 
confirmed that very often the politicians 
have abandoned the long-term objective 
of price stability in order to satisfy their 
electoral interests. To influence the 
public’s choice and therefore succeed in 
elections, political power tries to obtain 
short-term economic growth through an 
expansionist monetary policy that 
generated inflation
1. This means that a 
government has more motives to 
stimulate the economy before the 
elections or reduce real public deficit 
                                                                                                  
1 Brociner A., Monetary Europe, Ed. Institutul 
European, Iaşi, 1999,  p. 57 
(financing the budgetary deficit through 
money issuing), and, thus, ignoring the 
price stability goal. An independent 
central bank does not take such political 
interests into consideration, being rather 
preoccupied in protecting price stability. 
 
1. Theoretical considerations 
regarding the central bank 
independence 
  
  1.1. Concept of central bank 
independence 
  
Concerning what is meant by 
independence, there are many definitions 
of this concept, each of them focusing on 
certain feature of this controversial topic. 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 
(1991) have made a fundamental 
distinction between political and 
economic independence. While, political 
independence is defined as the ability of 
the central bank to determine objective of 
low inflation free of the government’s 
influence,  economic independence 
represents the ability of the central bank 
to determine and implement its policies 
towards the attainment of its objectives
2.  
The more agreed terminology in 
terms of central bank independence 
belongs to Debelle and Fischer (1994). 
They emphasize the distinction between 
goal independence and instrument 
independence.  Goal independence 
represents the freedom of the central 
bank to set the final goals of monetary 
policy without the interference of the 
government. Consequently, a central 
bank with goal independence might, for 
example, choose that low inflation is less 
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significant than output stability and 
proceed accordingly. The goal 
independence is closely linked with Grilli, 
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) notion 
of political independence. Instrument 
independence represents the freedom of 
the central bank to choose without 
restraint the means by which it pursuit to 
accomplish its goals of monetary policy. 
If the goals of monetary policy are exactly 
stipulated in a contract with the 
government, than the central bank has 
no goal independence, but it has 
instrument independence since it decides 
the means by which it attempts to attain 
the pre-assigned goals
3. 
 
1.2. Arguments in favour and 
against central bank independence 
 
Many studies reveal that the 
countries with an independent central 
bank experience low level of inflation 
than those in which the government has 
power over the central bank. Three 
important arguments sustain this finding
4. 
First argument provided by the literature 
in favour of this conclusion in that the 
central banks are exposed to strong 
political pressures to act accordingly with 
the government’s preference. A 
restrictive monetary policy might amplify 
the budgetary deficit and the government 
could therefore desire an expansive 
monetary inflation, with negative effect on 
the evolution of inflation. Thus, the more 
power the government posses in 
appointing the board members of central 
bank the more likely it will be that the 
central bank supports the policies which 
are promoted by the government. 
A second argument which 
clarifies why central bank independence 
may decrease on inflation is based on 
difference between the fiscal authority 
and monetary authority (Sargent and 
                                                 
                                                 3  Debelle G. and Fischer S. (1994), How 
independent should a central bank be?, 
Proceedings of a Conference held at North 
Falmouth, Massachusetts, p. 197 
4 Eijffinger S. and De Han J. (1996), Special Papers 
in International Economics no 19, p. 12 
Wallace, 1981). If fiscal policy is 
dominant, monetary authority will be 
constrained to finance budgetary deficit 
by money creation. By contrast, if 
monetary policy is prevailing, fiscal 
authority will be constrained to reduce 
the budgetary deficit. As a result, the 
more independent the central bank is, the 
less the fiscal authority will constrained 
the monetary to finance budgetary deficit 
by money issuing.  
The most important argument for 
central bank independence is based on 
time-inconsistency theory elaborates by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro 
and Gordon (1983). Time-inconsistency 
arises when the policies considered to be 
optimal today for future period are no 
longer optimal when that period in fact 
begins and, thus, are not implemented. 
This could lead to the implementation of 
inflationary policies in their place. Thus, 
time-inconsistency could cause higher 
inflation or, in other word, inflationary 
bias
5. The more efficient method to solve 
time-inconsistency problem consist of the 
introduction of predetermined rules in 
monetary policy, namely, the central 
bank’s commitment to respect certain 
monetary policy rules.  
  Despite of these positive 
arguments, there are two major 
objections against central bank 
independence
6. First of them is regarding 
the lack of accountability, being arise 
mainly by the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Some authors consider that the monetary 
policy is just similar to other instruments 
of macroeconomic policy and, therefore, 
have to be decided completely by the 
democratically elected representatives. 
This point of view sustains an implication 
of politicians in monetary policy. But 
central bank independence and 
democratic accountability may be 
implemented in various modalities, by 
 
5  Richard D. (2003), Time-inconsistent monetary 
policies: recent research, FRBSF Economic Letter 
no. 10, p. 1-3  
6 Eijffinger S. and De Han J. (1996), Special Papers 
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dividing the responsibilities between 
government and central bank. 
The second objection refers to 
the possible damages caused to 
economic policy coordination. Some 
theoretical studies have focused on the 
conflict that may arise when the 
government manages fiscal policy and 
the central bank manages monetary 
policy. Both of them decide on own 
priorities and may and not cooperate in 
implementing their policies. If they decide 
to not collaborate it is likely to appear a 
conflict of interests between fiscal and 
monetary policy. But these studies are 
not very concluding. Dealing with the 
shortcoming of these studies Debelle 
(1993) reaches the conclusion that 
objectives of fiscal policy affect not only 
the central bank independence, but also 
the inflation rate. 
 
1.3. Measurement of the central 
bank independence 
 
Majority of the indices used for 
the measurement of central bank 
independence take into account a 
number of observable factors, but there 
are also unobservable characteristics 
with significant influence on central bank 
independence. These indices are based 
on diverse criteria that define legal 
independence. (Alesina, 1988, 1989; 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; 
Eijffinger  şiScarling, 1992, 1993; 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty, 1992)
7. 
Alesina (1988, 1989) extended 
the codification realized by Bade and 
Parkin (1988), creating an index based 
on the following aspects: whether the 
central bank has final authority over 
monetary policy, whether government 
officials sit on the governing board of the 
bank, and whether more then half of the 
board members are appointed by the 
government. 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 
(1991) construct two indices:  
                                                 
                                                
7 Eijffinger S. and De Han J. (1996), Special Papers 
in International Economics no 19, p. 22-23 
  the political independence 
indicator based on the appointment 
procedures for board members, the 
length of members’ terms in office, and 
the existence of the statutory prerequisite 
to pursue price stability; 
  the economic independence 
indicator focused on the extent to which 
central bank implements freely monetary 
policy without the influence of 
government.  
An indicator for legal 
independence was employed by Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), 
corresponding to the total score of both 
political and economic independence.  
Eijffinger and Scarling, (1992, 
1993) realized an index taking in 
consideration the position of final 
responsibility for monetary policy, the 
absence or presence of a government 
official in the board of central bank, and 
the percentages of board appointees 
made by the government. 
One of the most widely employed 
indices was conceived by Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapty in 1992
8, which 
measures the legal central bank 
independence. It takes into account 
various stipulations in the law regarding 
the organisation and functioning of 
central banks. This index was based on a 
codification of sixteen various legal 
characteristics of central banks as stated 
in their charters. These are grouped into 
four clusters of issues: procedures for the 
appointment and dismissal of the 
governor of the central bank, 
independence for policy formulation, 
objectives of monetary policy and 
establishment of limits on lending by the 
central bank to the public sector.  
They obtain an index that 
measured the legal central bank 
independence for four decades (1950-
1989) in 72 countries (21 industrial 
countries and 51 developing countries). 
Their investigation shows that legal 
 
8  Cuckierman A., Webb S., Neyapti B. (1992.), 
Measuring the independence of central bank and its 
effect on policy outcomes, Word Bank Economic 
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central bank independence is negatively 
related to inflation in industrial countries, 
but not in developing countries. By 
contrast, in these countries, the 
governors’ turnover rate is robustly and 
positively associated with inflation.  
Since then, the situation has 
suffered important changes, as reforms 
of central banks have taken place in 
many transition economies. A recent 
paper of Cukierman Geoffrey and Bilin 
(2000)
9 introduces additional data on the 
legal independence of the new central 
bank in 26 former socialist countries. 
These data are constructed using the 
same codification system for measuring 
legal independence that was developed 
by Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapty 
(1992). Their finding was that legal 
central bank independence in former 
socialist countries during the ’90s was 
higher than that of the central bank in 
developed countries during the ’80s, 
indicating that the transition economies 
implemented very ambitious the reforms 
of central bank. 
The major conclusion of 
Cukierman Geoffrey and Bilin (2000) is 
that the negative relation between 
inflation and legal independence appears 
as well in the transition economies but 
only at sufficiently high levels of 
economic liberalization. In transition 
countries, the legal independence of 
central bank is unrelated to inflation 
during the early phases of liberalization 
because the process of decontrol of 
domestic prices had a powerful impact on 
inflation. 
In 1992, Cukierman,  Webb and 
Neyapti
10 also developed an indicator of 
actual central bank independence from 
the actual frequency of the change of the 
governor. They calculated the average 
annual turnover rates of central bank 
                                                 
9 Cukierman A., Geoffrey M., Bilin N. (2000), 
Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in 
transition economies. An international perspective, 
Center for Economic Research, No. 106, p. 11 
10 Cuckierman A., Webb S., Neyapti B. (1992.), 
Measuring the independence of central bank and its 
effect on policy outcomes, Word Bank Economic 
Review no.6, p.363-367 
governors in the industrial and 
developing countries between 1950 and 
1989 and found out that the turnover 
rates in developing countries were 
considerably higher than in industrial 
countries. The turnover rate is not 
significant in explaining the variation of 
inflation within industrial countries, but, in 
developing countries, there is a positive 
relation between the governors’ turnover 
and inflation.  
  Even if these four indicators are 
all based on a similar approach, they 
sometimes indicate very different results 
because of the diverse interpretation of 
central bank law stipulations and of the 
diverse aspects of central bank 
independence taking into account in their 
construction. 
 
2. Central bank independence and 
inflation 
  
Following the revolutionary 
research by Rogoff (1985), who proved 
that inflationary bias could be reduced by 
delegating monetary policy to an 
independent central bank, a several 
empirical studies have provided evidence 
for the negative relationship between 
central bank independence and inflation 
for developed economies (Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; 
Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti, 1992; 
Alesina and Summers, 1993; Jonsson, 
1995, etc.). Still, empirical evidence from 
developing countries has been less clear-
cut. Moreover, some recent studies have 
formulated reservations on the strength 
of the existing findings even for 
developed countries (Posen, 1993; 
Campillo and Miron, 1997; Forder, 1998; 
King and Ma, 2001).  
Using data for developing 
countries Campillo and Miron (1997) 
argue that central bank independence 
has no importance in determining 
inflation outcomes, once other factors are 
held constant. This finding could be 
disapproved, as Campillo and Miron 
(1997) use a legal indicator for central 
bank independence which most 
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unreliable for developing countries. 
Temple (1998) finds that if high inflation 
countries are added to his sample of 
OECD and developing countries, the 
effect of central bank independence 
(proxied by legal index of Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapty, 1992) on inflation 
disappears. Moreover, Mangano (1998) 
consider that central bank independence 
is rather an issue exposed of subjective 
interpretations
11. 
By contrast, analysing the 
situation of central bank independence in 
transition countries, Maliszewski (2000) 
proved that there is a robust correlation 
between central bank independence and 
inflation but only at a high level of 
economic liberalization
12. The same 
conclusion was reached by Cukierman 
(2002), which extends the Cukierman 
(1992) index to 26 transition economies 
during the nineties, indicating that legal 
central bank independence is negatively 
correlated with inflation in Eastern 
Europe bur only at a sufficiently high and 
sustained level of liberalization. The 
conclusion was that the legal central 
bank independence and inflation are 
negatively related in both developed and 
developing countries and that, 
consequently, they are negatively related 
internationally.  
Daunfeldt and Luna (2003) 
analysed the effects of institutional 
reforms that granted the central bank 
more independence from political 
influence on the efforts to obtain low and 
stable inflation in 23 OECD countries. 17 
of them had implemented institutional 
reforms that granted their central bank a 
high independence level.  
They investigate the inflation 
beginning in 1975, being interested in the 
shift from high inflation to the low inflation 
                                                 
                                                
11 Daunfeldt S., Luna X. (2003), Central Bank 
Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 
OECD-countries, The Swedish research Institute of 
Trade, Umea University, p. 2-3 
12 Maliszewski W. (2000), Central bank 
independence in transition economies, Centre for 
Social and Economic Research, London Scholl of 
Economics and Political Science, p. 18 
 
recorded nowadays in most of the OECD 
countries. Their analysis showed that 
price stability had been achieved before 
the implementation date in the majority of 
the countries that have adopted central 
bank reforms in 11 out of 17 countries. 
As a consequence, central bank 
independence cannot be responsible for 
the shift from high to low inflation. Price 
stability had also been achieved in 
countries that didn’t adopt independence 
reforms, such as Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Germany or United States of 
America. There were countries, namely 
Greece, New Zealand, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, where price stability was reached 
only after the implementation date, but 
the moments were very close, indicating 
that the transition from high to low 
inflation was almost finished when the 
central bank reforms were implemented. 
However, the authors concluded that a 
more independent central bank might 
have played an important role in 
diminishing the inflation rates. They do 
not reject the idea that low inflation 
cannot be guaranteed in the long run with 
independent central banks
13. 
Jacome and Vasquez (2005) 
assessed the central banks’ charters in 
24 Latin American countries and 
Caribbean countries during the nineties. 
They found out that there are significant 
regional differences, as central bank 
reform was widely implemented in Latin 
American countries but almost inexistent 
in Caribbean countries. As a result, most 
central banks in Latin America enjoy 
higher independence, while Caribbean 
central banks are still politically 
dependent on the executive branch. 
However, inflation evolution in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries did 
not vary much during the 1990s. 
Calculating three alternative indexes of 
legal central bank independence and 
after controlling international inflation, the 
exchange regime, and the banking 
 
13 Daunfeldt S., Luna X. (2003), Central Bank 
Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 
OECD-countries, The Swedish research Institute of 
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crises, they obtained a strong negative 
correlation between legal central bank 
independence and inflation
14. 
However, most of theoretical and 
empirical studies show that countries with 
an independent central bank will reach a 
lower level of inflation rate than those 
where the monetary policy of central 
bank is influenced by government. 
Moreover, the improvement of inflation 
performance as a result of an increased 
independence of central bank does not 
been reached with a cost in terms of 
declined growth (Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini, 1991). 
 
3. Central bank independence and 
economic performance 
 
Many empirical studies verified 
the relationship between central bank 
independence and real economic 
variables, such as growth, interest rate 
and unemployment.  
As for the first relationship, Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) argue 
that real growth and central bank 
independence are unrelated in the cases 
of developed economies. Their 
conclusion was similar to the results of 
other authors, such as Alesina and 
Summers (1993) and Cukierman, 
Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Web (1993). 
The latest paper indicates that turnover 
rate of central bank governors as the 
proxy for independence is negatively 
associated with the growth in developing 
countries
15.  
Concerning the second and third 
correlations, Alesina and Summers 
(1993) could not find any correlation 
between central bank independence and 
real interest rates or between central 
bank independence and unemployment. 
                                                                                                  
14 Jacome L., Vaszquez F. (2005), Any link between 
legal central bank independence and inflation? 
Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
IMF Working Paper no. 75, p. 24 
15 Cuckierman A., Kalaitzidakis, Summers, Web 
(1993.), Central bank independence, growth, 
investment and real rates, Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policies no.39, North-
Holland, p. 96, 110 
By contrast, Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, 
Summers, and Web (1993) found that the 
variability of both nominal and real 
interest rates is negatively associated 
with the legal central bank independence. 
Moreover, Cukierman and Lippi (1999) 
and Velasco and Guzzo (1999) studied 
the relationship between central bank 
independence and unemployment. Their 
conclusion was that employment is 
decreasing in the countries with an 
independent central bank
16. 
There are a number of empirical 
researches on the relationship between 
the central bank independence and the 
cost of disinflation measured by sacrifice 
ratio (Ball, 1994, 1997; Gartner, 1995; 
Fischer, 1996). The sacrifice ratio 
represents the cumulative increase in the 
yearly rate of unemployment that is due 
to the disinflation effort divided by the 
total decrease in the rate of inflation. 
Some of these studies demonstrate that 
the sacrifice ratio is higher in the case of 
central bank independence. 
Consequently, there is a positive and 
significant relation between central bank 
independence and the sacrifice ratio.  
Posen (1995, 1998) formulated a 
similar conclusion, as a result of its 
analysis on the public and private sectors 
behaviour in a sample of 17 OECD 
countries in order to evidence disparities 
in credibility of central banks. His study 
did not provide evidence that the costs of 
disinflation are lower in countries with 
more independent central banks. By 
contrast, the costs of disinflation are 
higher and the duration is the same in 
countries with independent central bank. 
So, there is a significant and positive 
correlation between the central bank 
independence and the costs of 
disinflation
17. 
 
16 Cuckierman A., Lippi F. (1999.), Central bank 
independence, centralization of wage bargaining, 
inflation and unemployment: theory and some 
evidence, European Economic Review no.43, 1428 
17 Posen A. (1995), Central bank independence and 
disinflationary credibility: a missing link?, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Reports no.1, p. 
27  
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In spite of the fact that legal 
independence does not always fully 
translate into actual independence, it is 
nonetheless associated with significantly 
lower inflation. For a given level of 
independence from the political 
authorities a more focused legal mandate 
to pursue price stability is expected to 
result in a lower rate of inflation. 
Numerous empirical studies suggest that 
central bank independence does not 
improve economic growth and 
employment. Also, there is no evidence 
that countries where central bank is more 
independent have lower cost of 
disinflation that those where central bank 
is dependent by the political authorities. 
In fact, the majority of studies prove that 
central bank independence is associated 
with a higher disinflation costs.  
However, most empirical studies 
suggest that central bank independence 
does not improve economic growth and 
employment. Also, there is no evidence 
that countries where central bank is more 
independent have lower cost of 
disinflation that those where central bank 
is dependent by the political authorities. 
In fact, the majority of studies prove that 
central bank independence is associated 
with a higher disinflation costs.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the recent years, most of 
member countries of the European 
Union, majority of the OECD members 
and, as well as, a growing number of 
both newly industrializing countries and 
former socialist economies have granted 
a high independence to their central 
bank.  
A large literature has 
demonstrated the existence of a negative 
correlation between central bank 
independence and inflation: countries 
with independent central bank have 
managed to keep the inflation under 
control. Moreover, the improvement of 
inflation performance as a result of an 
increased independence of central bank 
does not been achieved with a cost in 
terms of declined growth. 
  Even though an independent 
central bank is neither an enough nor 
required condition for maintaining price 
stability, we consider that countries with 
an independent central bank experience 
a lower inflation than those where 
politicians are allowed to guide the 
monetary policy of central bank. 
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